A major obstacle for the transformation to a low-carbon economy is the carbon lock-in: fossil fuel-based ("dirty") technologies dominate the market although their carbon-free ("clean") alternatives are dynamically more efficient. We study the interaction of learning-by-doing spillovers with the substitution elasticity between a clean and a dirty sector to evaluate the robustness of policies averting the carbon lock-in. We find that the substitution possibilities between the two sectors have an ambivalent effect: although a high substitution elasticity requires less aggressive mitigation policies than a low one, it creates a greater welfare loss through the lock-in in the absence of regulation. The socially optimal policy response consists of a permanent carbon tax as well as a learning subsidy for clean technologies. We thus indicate that the policy implications of [Acemoglu et al. 2012] , calling for merely temporary interventions based on the mechanism of directed technical change in the same setting, are limited in scope. Our results also highlight that infrastructure provision is crucial to facilitate the low-carbon transformation.
Introduction
Climate mitigation requires drastic cuts in emissions in the 21 st century and necessitates a transformation from a fossil-fuel based to a decarbonised economy. Both empirical evidence and theoretical argument suggest that a main obstacle to this transformation is the possibility of a carbon lock-in [Unruh 2000] , [Schmidt and Marschinski 2009 , Davis and Caldeira 2010 , Lehmann et al. 2012 : the economy remains in an equilibrium in which carbon-intensive ("dirty") technologies dominate the market although they are intertemporally inferior to low-carbon ("clean") alternatives. The size of such a market failure and the appropriate policy responses to it crucially depend on the substitution possibilities between such sectors, which are influenced by infrastructures, yet sometimes also by behavioural and institutional factors. They also depend on the mechanism underlying the development of clean production technologies. Which policy options best advance structural change towards the low-carbon economy is less clear: few studies have examined policy responses that are sufficient to avoid a carbon lock-in [Fisher and Newell 2008, Gerlagh et al. 2009 ].
The purpose of this study is twofold: First, we contribute to evaluating policy instruments potentially averting a lock-in by studying the impact of the substitution elasticity between a dirty and a clean sector. We find an ambivalent effect: A high elasticity creates a greater lock-in in the absence of regulation, but also requires less drastic policy intervention. Second, our results contradict [Acemoglu et al. 2012] (henceforth: AABH), who study the impact of directed technical change in the framework of the present article: with learning-by-doing behavior of clean technologies instead of directed technical change effective mitigation policies need to be permanent, not temporary, regardless of the value of the substitution elasticity.
We use a two-sector intertemporal general equilibrium model and solve it numerically to identify policy options that are sufficient to avoid high welfare losses. A common stylized setting is employed to depict structural change to a low-carbon economy: there is one clean sector, without emissions, and one dirty, emitting greenhouse gases. This approach has been adopted by AABH and for instance also by [Gerlagh and Hofkes 2002] and [Cassou and Hamilton 2004] . Our model set-up is similar to that of AABH in order to be comparable in terms of policy implications. However, while AABH focuses on the effects of directed technical change for the transformation to a low-carbon economy, our work relies on the assumption of learning through spillover effects in the clean sector as its capacity is built up.
Such a learning-by-doing approach is well-established within energy economics [Kverndokk and Rosendahl 2007] : The cost of renewable technologies decreases with cumulative installed capacity at a stable rate [Fischedick et al. 2011, ch. 10.5.2] . No comparable effect exists for dirty, mature technologies [MacDonald and Schrattenholzer 2001] . It has moreover been demonstrated theoretically that -in presence of learning-by-doing externalities -optimal carbon pricing is insufficient to overcome a lock-in into mature low-carbon technologies in the energy market [Kalkuhl et al. 2012] . We discuss the differences between the assumptions of learning through increased capacity and directed technological change and their empirical plausibility (Section 2.1.3).
The carbon lock-in was originally examined from a systemic perspective highlighting the co-evolution of technology and institutions [Unruh 2000 ]: the technologically caused lock-in is exacerbated by institutional and policy failures. Our analysis focuses exclusively on the lock-in as a phenomenon of market failure and leaves aside institutional failures. In our model the lock-in arises through the combination of two externalities: First, learning spillovers that arise from building up capacities in the clean sector are unappropriated and are a stylized representation of positive externalities in the development of low-carbon technologies. Second, the negative effects of carbon-intensive production on utility through climate damages are ignored in the unregulated market outcome. The combination of the externalities can prevent the market from building-up the carbon-free sector and cause a delayed transition to the low-carbon economy. Different interpretations of the concept of a carbon lockin are frequent [Lehmann et al. 2012 , Page 2006 , with some focussing on the nonmalleability of capital, for instance by irreversible investment in coal power plants, as an additional cause of the suboptimal share of clean production. Instead we focus here on the interplay between one cause inhibiting the development of the clean sector and the substitution possibilities: as the latter represent infrastructural and institutional limitations to produce clean instead of dirty goods, it is the interplay of both factors that captures the co-evolution of technology and institutions. Since the specific model setup matters for analysing the carbon lock-in, we rely on numerical solutions instead of using a less realistic model that would be more amenable to analytical treatment. The model is described in Section 2.
The principal message of our study is that although a higher substitution elasticity requires less aggressive optimal mitigation policies, it creates higher welfare losses from a lock-in. This ambivalent role of the substitution possibility suggests to also examine second-best policy responses: We find that even if the only policy option available is a carbon tax, it can correct most of the welfare loss from the lock-in if the tax is set much higher. Furthermore, comparing the results from this study with those of AABH demonstrates that whether climate change mitigation requires a permanent or a merely temporary policy intervention depends primarily on the mechanism governing technological progress in the clean sector and not on the value of the substitution elasticity. We find that the optimal policy suggested by AABH, which is temporary and triggers a sudden switch from the carbon-intensive to the low-carbon sector, does not reproduce the socially optimal outcome in our model. Instead, effective mitigation policies need to be permanent, regardless of the value of the substitution elasticity. By contrast, substitution possibilities crucially influence the feasibility of different policy options: we find that more stringent mitigation targets require a (much) higher carbon tax if the elasticity is low. This motivates a policy that increases the elasticity, particularly in the light of estimates that current substitution possibilities between clean and dirty sectors are very low [Hourcade et al. 2011 , Pelli 2011 . The simulation results are presented in Section 3.
We interpret the impact of the substitution elasticity for both the electricity and the transport sector. We conclude that in those sectors substitution possibilities can be mostly understood in terms of technology and infrastructure, although behavioural effects are important in the transport sector, too. This highlights the need for additional policy that increases the elasticity, for example financing appropriate energy infrastructure or fostering institutional changes towards intermodal transport (Section 4).
Model
We use a discrete-time intertemporal general equilibrium model that is similar to that of AABH except for the different conception of technological progress and the different role of government policy options. There are two sectors, one emissionintensive ("dirty") and one carbon-free ("clean"). Those sectors manufacture inputs used in the production of a final good that can be freely used for investment in each sector or for consumption. Households ignore the effect of global warming, which is described by the heuristic approximation chosen in AABH. Technological progress in the clean sector is subject to a learning-by-doing effect based on its cumulative capacity, technological progress in the dirty sector is exogenously given.
The decentralized equilibrium contains two market failures: First, the environmental externality -dirty production decreases utility through damages of global warming -is not taken into account by the decentralized agents. Second, firms in the clean sector do not appropriate the intertemporal learning spillover resulting from their production.
The decentralized economy
We present the maximization problems of the agents in the economy and how policy instruments enter their choices. The derivations of the first-order conditions are given in Appendix A.
Demand
The representative household derives utility U t from consumption C t and the environmental quality, represented as the size of the carbon sink S t :
with η = 1. The function φ(S t ) represents the impact of climate damages on utility including the possibility of an environmental catastrophe and is specified in Section 2.1.4. The household maximizes intertemporal utility, which is given by:
It is assumed that the effect of the investment decisions on S t is ignored, thus representing climate change as an externality. The household owns labour L t and capital K t and faces the budget constraint
with I t denoting investment, r i,t the interest rate, w i,t the wage in sector i = 1, 2 and Γ t the lump-sum transfer from the government budget to the household. The price of consumption is set to one as the final good is chosen as numeraire. The maximization is also subject to the dynamic constraint on the capital stock
with depreciation rate δ. The household can distribute labour and capital arbitrarily between the sectors:L
Labour is normalized to 1 for simplicity. 
in which t > 0 represents the elasticity of substitution between the clean and dirty goods. The higher the elasticity t , the better substitutable are the clean and the dirty good. It may change with time exogenously. Intermediate good Y i is produced from capital K i and labour L i according to a Cobb-Douglas production function:
Final-good Producer. The final good producer maximizes profits Π :
where p 1 , p 2 are the prices of the clean and dirty goods and τ 1 is a tax on emissionintensive products (carbon tax). Dirty sector. Technological progress A 1,t evolves exogenously in the dirty sector, reflecting an exogenous growth rate or total factor productivity g e :
The dirty firm maximizes profits Π 1 :
Clean sector. In the clean sector, technological progress is endogenous and depends on the cumulative output of that sector through learning-by-doing. The cumulative output represents the stock of experiences made and is thus formalised as:
H 0 denotes the inital stock of knowledge. The technology of the sector also depends on the total factor productivity g e and is given by
This functional form is justified as follows: Sector-unspecific total factor productivity is denoted by g e , whereas β, γ and ω determine the shape of the learning curve for the clean technology. The level the clean technology converges to when it reaches maturity is given by β, thus determining the maximum productivity. The speed of the convergence to that level is determined by ω and γ. The three parameters together determine the learning rate of the technology. It is additionally assumed that H 0 is small, so that technology in the dirty sector is initially much more advanced. Moreover, we assume β > A 1,0 in accordance with expectations on efficiency of renewable technologies in the future [Breyer 2013, Kost and Schlegel 2012] . Clean technology thus lags behind and takes more time to develop, but will eventually be more advanced than dirty technology. On this high level of generality the chosen learning curve of the clean technology in the model cannot correspond to actual data of the learning behaviour of renewable energies. Yet the functional form employed is commonly used for the learning behaviour of carbon-free technologies [Kalkuhl et al. 2012] and similar modelling of learning-by-doing is very common in energy economics [Kverndokk and Rosendahl 2007, Edenhofer et al. 2005] .
It is assumed for simplicity that spillovers in the clean sector are totally unappropriated by firms: individual firms are small enough that they do not take into account their individual contribution to the stock of global knowledge. (See [Romer 1986 ] and [Fisher and Newell 2008] for a more sophisticated treatment.)
The clean firm maximizes profits Π 2 :
Here τ 2 is a subsidy on clean output.
No capital inertia in investments is assumed: in equilibrium wages and interest rates are equalized across sectors because production factors are perfectly mobile. Thus:
and r 1 = r 2 .
Next, the development of the clean and dirty technology chosen here is compared to the mechanism propounded by AABH in Section 2.1.3.
2.1.3. Two conceptions of technological progress: learning-by-doing vs. directed technical change Technological progress that differs between the two sectors of an economy leads to different sectoral growth rates [Baumol 1967 ]. For the case of structural change towards the low-carbon economy AABH focus on endogenously determined sectorbiased technological progress -directed technical change (DTC) [Acemoglu 2002 ]. Our approach is to assume a sector-biased technological change that is exogenously given, but inspired by empirical findings on the learning of low-carbon technologies.
Here we compare the two approaches and discuss their relevance.
In the model of AABH, profit-incentives of workers in research and development ("scientists") determine whether technological progress proceeds in the clean or dirty sector. However, the numerical calibration of that model reveals that it exhibits "bang-bang" solutions: If the clean sector is significantly more productive than the dirty sector, no dirty output will be produced and the whole workforce will work in the clean sector and vice versa. This is due to the specific calibration of the direction of technical change: From Lemma 1 and Equations (11) and (24) of AABH as well as the specified calibration (γ = 1; η d = η c = 0.02) in Section V of that study one can deduce that if all innovation improves the technology of the dirty sector A 1 and none that of the clean sector A 2 :
If instead all innovation benefits the clean sector A 2 :
The former is the case if the dirty sector is much more advanced than the clean sector. The latter happens if there are sufficiently high subsidies for the clean sector. The switch between these two possibilities is either immediate or happens within a time span of approximately 15 years in AABHs numerical simulation, depending on different parameter combinations.
By contrast, we examine the impact of a well-document stylized empirical fact about low-carbon technologies on policies for advancing structural change: a decline in cost per unit output through learning effects due to increased experience [Fischedick et al. 2011, Ch. 10.5.2.] [Kost and Schlegel 2012] . No learning effect, at least not on a similar scale is known for mature, dirty technologies [MacDonald and Schrattenholzer 2001, Breyer 2013] , in particular as in this model, A 1 also reflects the cost of fossil fuel. While in our model there is an overall increase in total factor productivity that affects both sectors equally, technology in the clean sector A 2,t depends positively on cumulative capacity H t that represents the stock of experiences made with the low-carbon technology. (See Equation 11 in Section 2.1.2 for a detailed explanation.) Examining the impact of learning-by-doing mechanisms in the structural change framework adopted by AABH has already been called for [Hourcade et al. 2011] .
Which conception of technological progress is more plausible for modelling structural change at this abstract level? While there is some evidence for the concept of DTC [Popp 2002 ], the decisive factor for understanding the risk of intertemporal lock-ins during the transition to the low-carbon economy is the learning behaviour of renewable energies [Edenhofer et al. 2011] . Learning-by-doing is also the more comprehensive concept: It includes the migration of scientists and engineers to other sectors. Scientists and engineers need experiments to learn and need to build up capacities and equipment -this cannot be steered by huge research subsidy over a short time period as huge output of the clean technologies might not be profitable in a very short time span. The learning-by-doing approach thus stresses that the redirection of R&D-efforts is subject to path-dependencies in the careers of individuals, in the technological regulations and in the design and management of research institutions.
Our aim in this study is not to doubt the importance of DTC for understanding economic growth and structural change. We argue instead that the particular mechanism of DTC in the model of AABH represents a special case in the space of possible structural transformations towards the low-carbon economy, conflicting with empirical studies of the learning behaviour of technologies. We identify an immediate switch between sectors as produced by AABHs model as corresponding to a very high learning curve in our model (see Section 3.4). Our study hence shows that focusing on the learning behaviour of low-carbon technologies changes the picture of sensible policy responses to the carbon lock-in.
Climate damages
The climate externality caused by the production of the dirty sector and its negative impact on utility are modelled as in AABH 1 . In particular there is the possibility of an "environmental disaster" (zero utility) at very high temperatures. The size of the carbon sink S t evolves as follows:
if the right-hand side is between 0 and the pre-industrial levelS. S t+1 = 0 if the right-hand side is negative, and S t+1 =S if the right-hand side is greater thanS. S is now related to global mean temperature as follows: assume the standard approximation that if ∆ is global mean temperature and C CO2 is carbon concentration in the atmosphere, then:
Assume further:
So ∆ can be expressed as a smooth function of S if C CO2 ≥ 280 :
Finally, define the function φ(S t ) introduced above as the argument of the utility function that gives utility the desired property of a possible environmental disaster and follows appropriate standard assumptions about climate damages for a moderate temperature increase (detailed in AABH, Sections I. and V A.):
Equilibria of the Economy
We distinguish three types of equilibria: the social optimum, the laissez-faire equilibrium and the decentralized equilibirium with government intervention. We obtain our results by comparing different policy choices of the government with the social optimum and the laissez-faire equilibrium.
Social Optimum
Determining the social optimum provides a benchmark for evaluating the effectiveness of policy options. The social planner determines the optimal allocation in the economy by maximizing intertemporal utility of the representative agent subject to the constraints on factors of production, the production technologies, the influence of environmental quality and the macroeconomic budget constraint. The social planner problem is thus:
subject to the Equations (11), (4) - (10), (16) - (20) and the macroeconomic budget constraint Y t = C t + I t . The social planner hence recognizes both the negative impact of the carbonintensive production on the household's utility through decreasing environmental quality as well as the productivity gains through learning-by-doing in the clean sector.
Decentralized equilibrium with government intervention
The first-order conditions following from the agents' maximization problems above (given in Appendix A) describe a market equilibrium with given policy instruments. The government anticipates the agents choices and sets the policy variables -the carbon tax and the learning subsidy -with the aim of maximizing social welfare. It redistributes taxes and subsidies lump-sum to the representative agent.
The maximization problem of the government is thus:
subject to the the first-order conditions of the agents, the household's budget constraint, the technology constraints and the state of the carbon sink, that is subject to Equations (11), (3) - (20), (22) and (A.2) -(A.9).
Laissez-faire equilibrium
The laissez-faire equilibrium is a special case of the decentralized equilibrium with government intervention: the government's policy options are set to zero, implying unregulated markets.
Model calibration
The model is calibrated to be comparable with AABH. The time period of the numerical simulation corresponds to five years, intertemporal parameters are hence chosen with respect to that interval. The time horizon is T=175 years. Those parameters with values identical to the calibration of the model of AABH are displayed in Table B .3 in Appendix B. Since the technological progress and capital dynamics are conceptualised differently from AABH in the present model, a standard rate of capital depreciation (0.03% per year, that is δ = 0.141) is selected and the rate of exogenous technological progress is chosen to obtain a long-run growth rate of consumption of 1.8% per year. The remaining parameters for the technological progress in the clean sector are chosen such that the clean sector initially lags behind and eventually is more efficient than the dirty sector, so that technological progress reproduces the stylized facts about future learning of renewable technologies [Fischedick et al. 2011, Ch. 10 
Results
In this section the results of the numerical simulations of our model are reported. As the model has two externalities -pollution and information spillovers -two policy instruments are needed to reach the social optimum (first best). A policy with just one instrument cannot achieve the first best, and so is a second best policy. First the size of the lock-in is quantified (3.1), subsequently the optimal policy intervention is calculated as the welfare-maximizing tax paths (3.2). High welfare losses can be avoided even if only a single instrument is available to the government, providing a measure of the additional intervention due to the lock-in (3.3). The impact of a higher learning curve on the duration of the structural change is examined (3.4). Finally, the optimal policy is characterized when the social optimum is constrained by a two degree target (3.5).
Throughout, three cases for the substitution possibilities for clean and dirty production are considered and represented by values of the substitution elasticity . Two cases, = 3 and = 10, are equal to those in AABH's numerical simulation to make our findings comparable with that study. In addition a third case is examined in which increases linearly over time from initially = 3 up to = 10 eventually, the computationally simplest case of an increasing elasticity. This case represents future infrastructure developments designed to facilitate the use of clean instead of dirty goods (see Section 4). The three cases are labelled the "low", "high" and "increasing" scenario below. Welfare losses resulting from sub-optimal or missing policy intervention are quantified in balanced-growth equivalents (BGE) [Mirrlees and Stern 1972, Anthoff and Tol 2009 ] as environmental quality enters utility directly.
All subsequent numerical results are very model specific and their rationale is to make general points only: the values of the various measures of the carbon lock-in should be understood as highly uncertain.
Lock-In
In the unregulated decentralized equilibrium the economy produces too much of the dirty good compared to the social optimum: The intertemporally inferior carbonintensive technology dominates the market and a transition to the low-carbon economy occurs later than would be socially optimal. For a high substitution elasticity the lock-in is generally more severe than for a low one: with a high elasticity there is less demand for clean production so the learning in that sector takes longer and aggravates the market failure. The lock-in into the dirty sector is quantified in three respects: (a) the aggregate discounted welfare losses over time are measured in balanced-growth equivalents, (b) the delay of the structural transformation is given as the difference between the socially optimal and actual time of reaching a 50 % share of the clean sector and (c) the total and the additional amount of global warming compared to the social optimum is calculated. For the different substitution scenarios the simulations can be summarized as follows: The "high" scenario leads to a much greater lock-in compared to the "low" scenario on all scales, whereas the "increasing" scenario represents an intermediate case, see Figure 1 . Figure 2 compares the socially optimal time paths with those of the unregulated market outcome for the share of the clean and the dirty sector and the state of the atmosphere. There are significant differences in the deviations of the decentralized paths from the socially optimal outcome: In the "low" case a share of the clean sector is missing that is approximately constant over time, while in the "high" case the switch from the dirty to the clean sector is delayed, the "increasing" scenario representing a middle case. The socially optimal amount of global warming is below 2 • C for the "high" and "increasing" case and 2.9 • C for the "low" case: due to the difficulty in substituting away from low-carbon production it is socially optimal to accept more global warming in order to have more consumption. However, the better the substitution possibilities, the higher is the additional amount of global warming produced by the externality. 
First-best Policy Response
In the absence of policy intervention, severe welfare losses occur due to the combination of market failures that creates the lock-in. This motivates the subsequent analysis of policy responses that avoid it. To correct the externalities, a carbon tax and a learning subsidy are feasible policy instruments. The welfare-maximizing time paths of the policy instruments are computed for the three different substitution possibilities (Figure 3) . In all cases, carbon prices are increasing with time, and, with the exception of the "high" case of = 10, subsidies are decreasing. The subsidy for the case of = 10 is non-monotonic for the following reason: Initially, subsidising the clean sector is not necessary because it is not competitive enough and it is sufficient if the subsidy starts later for the clean sector to dominate later on -which indicates that for such substitution possibilities the switch from one dominating technology to the other can be very fast. For the "low" case of = 3 the optimal policy involves a substantially higher carbon price and a moderately higher learning subsidy than in the other cases. Except for an initially high learning subsidy, the "increasing" case requires policy instruments much more in the order of the "high" case than the "low" case. The optimal policy intervention for the structural change to avoid the lock-in is permanent for all scenarios and the subsidy, although it is decreasing, must last at least as long as no more learning can occur because the maximum productivity is reached. 3.3. The size of the carbon lock-in as additional intervention: Second-best policy with a single instrument In a second-best policy scenario the government has only a single instrument available to maximize welfare. Even in this case it can significantly improve the market outcome. This second-best intervention requires that the single instrument is set significantly higher compared to the optimal intervention. Results are close to the social optimum: numerical solutions show that for the different cases of elasticities the second-best optimum does not produce losses greater than 0.002 % BGE, even if the first-best production and consumption paths differ markedly. This is an unsurprising result: Both the climate and the learning externality impact the distribution of inputs to the dirty and clean sector. So one instrument set significantly higher than in the first-best optimum can correct much of the second externality.
This result is illustrated for the case that the carbon tax is the single instrument available to the government: Figure 4 displays the first-best (=Pigouvian) carbon tax τ 1,t compared to the single instrument carbon tax τ 1,t for the three cases of the substitution possibility. additional policy intervention that is specific of the lock-in and unrelated to the global warming externality per se. It takes into account that if substitution possibilities are poor, socially optimal mitigation is more difficult to achieve by policy intervention even if learning spillovers were appropriated. The additional cumulative carbon tax required by the lock-in is determined by calculating the additional policy intervention P Lock as the cumulative difference between the two carbon tax paths (P Lock = 150 t=0 (τ 1,t − τ 1,t )). Table 1 shows that the policy intervention that is required to overcome the lock-in beyond correcting the climate externality is highest if substitution possibilities are low.
This finding completes our thesis that substitution possibilities play an ambivalent role: While in (3.1) it was shown that in the unregulated outcome good substitution possibilities cause the highest welfare losses, the numerical results of (3.2) and (3.3) demonstrate that poor substitution possibilities require the highest policy intervention.
The impact of a high learning curve on the transition
This subsection provides an elementary consideration about the dependence of the structural change on the learning curve. "Transition time" denotes the time taken in the social planner solution to reach a share of 80 % of the clean sector from at least a 20 % share of that sector. The transition time is calculated for two different learning curves for the clean technology. Besides the standard parametrisation of γ = 0.27 a low value of γ = 0.2 is considered that results in a higher learning curve (see Figure  5) . Table 2 presents the values of the transition time for two different learning curves and three cases of the substitution elasticity. This measure characterizes the transition from the fossil-fuel based to the low-carbon economy as a gradual adjustment or an immediate switch: the higher the substitution elasticity, the shorter the transition time.
By comparison, the numerical solution to AABH's model contains a rather abrupt switch (see Figure 1 D of AABH) due to the 'bang-bang behaviour' of technological progress (see Figure 1 B of AABH): In that model the transition time is 15 years for = 10 and 70 years for = 3 for the discount value of ρ = 0.001 (per year). Although the two conceptions of technological progress are very different, our analysis indicates that the outcome of ABBH's directed technical change corresponds to a learning curve of sudden extremely high competitivity. Such an outcome is implausible due spillovers are completely unappropriated. Thus the absolute magnitude of additional carbon tax due to the correction of the learning externality is not meaningful. to path-dependencies in technological development, as outlined in the discussion in Subsection 2.1.3.
Implications of a two degree target
Due to high uncertainties about economic damages and losses of human lives, standard cost-benefit-analysis is of limited normative cogency for evaluating policy responses to climate change. A more promising normative approach will seek to evaluate pathways of decarbonisation taking a guardrail on climate damages as given. Limiting the most severe impacts from climate change requires keeping global mean temperature below 2 • C [WBGU 2009, Lenton et al. 2008 ]. This two degree target has become the focus of many political efforts to limit global warming and economic studies have demonstrated its feasibility [Edenhofer et al. 2009 ].
Under the unconstrained cost-benefit analysis of climate damages, the socially optimal amount of global warming is significantly above 2 • C for low values of the substitution elasticity (see Figure 2 ) in our model: for = 3 it is 2.9 • C at t=175. For this case we compute the additional policy intervention necessary to comply with a two degree target. We find that the carbon tax for the two degree target is significantly -eventually about ten times -higher than the carbon tax from the first-best optimum of an unconstrained cost-benefit analysis (see Figure 6 ). Low substitution possibilities hence make ambitious mitigation very expensive and difficult to implement politically as they require aggressive carbon pricing towards the end of the decarbonisation. This motivates our subsequent discussion of understanding substitution possibilities as non-constant over time and potentially subject to further policy intervention.
Comparison to the findings of AABH
AABH argue that a high substitution elasticity between the carbon-intensive and the carbon-free sector of the economy facilitates the structural change from a carbon-intensive to a low-carbon economy as it requires an immediate, but less comprehensive and merely temporary policy intervention. We confirm this result with our model, but highlight that a high substitution elasticity also creates greater risks of a welfare loss from a lock-in. We disagree with AABH that an immediate, but temporary policy intervention is optimal: a permanent intervention is required if a more empirically plausible conception of advancing renewables is assumed 3 . This is a Own estimations from results given in [Acemoglu et al. 2012] immediate from comparing Figure 1 A and C of AABH with Figure 3 above. Our study can thus be seen as indicating that ABBH's policy advice for fostering lowcarbon structural change is limited in scope: it depends on a particular calibration of technological progress in the framework of directed technical change, the normative assumption of an unconstrained cost-benefit-analysis, the restriction to finding the optimal policy response and an elasticity of substitution between sectors that is constant over time. The lesson for giving policy advice is that there is a high variability of trajectories for structural change according to particular assumptions -for which often no well-established empirical estimates exist; no clear-cut policy message based on one assumption-set is hence legitimate.
Discussion: Substitution possibilities and infrastructure in real-world economic sectors
A substitution elasticity is not a natural constant, but an artefact of economic theory: the ease of using one technology or product instead of another one. We discuss our modelling results in the light of substitution possibilities from dirty to clean production for real-world sectors. We highlight three messages:
• Substitution possibilities are influenced by infrastructure in relevant sectors of the economy, as infrastructure crucially matters for enabling the use of a product. Yet behavioural and institutional factors can also influence substitutability.
• The substitution elasticity between clean and dirty production is currently not very high and the increasing case is the most plausible scenario for the coming decades.
• The substitution elasticity can be influenced by infrastructure investment.
We elaborate these messages concerning future substitution possibilities for two economic sectors: electricity and transport.
reaches the scale of an environmental disaster for any scenario examined in this study. Comparison between a cost-benefit analysis and a two degree target of the optimal carbon tax paths for a low substitution elasticity = 3 .
In the electricity sector the division between carbon-free and fossil-fuel based technologies is clear-cut. An estimate of the elasticity with the model of AABH in the electricity sector using historical output data finds that is around 0.5 for major countries in the last decades [Pelli 2011 ]. This contradicts the intuition developed in AABH's model that clean and dirty energy are good substitutes. It instead highlights the fact that in the 20 th century there was almost no energy infrastructure in place that was suitable for advancing carbon-free economic activities on a large scale.
Electricity is an almost perfectly homogenous good whether its generation is clean or dirty; however, the use as opposed to the generation of renewable energy is not straightforward and requires appropriate infrastructure. Consumers of electricity rarely have direct access to renewable energies: renewable energy production misaligns with electricity demand in time and space. Daily and seasonal fluctuations do not match demand and geographically advantageous generation capacity does not fit to load. Nevertheless infrastructure investments can enable renewable energy use in a way such that the misalignment across space and time is compensated for: Grid extensions allow large scale transfers of electricity from generation sites to load sites. If grid integration across large spatial scales (> 300km) is substantial, weather and climate fluctuations can be averaged out. Storage and demand management attenuate temporal fluctuations. We suggest that the investments in these infrastructures can be interpreted as an increase in the substitution possibilities and that for the case of electricity, infrastructure is the decisive determinant of substitution possibilities. It thus seems likely that a) current substitution possibilities are low as electricity infrastructure is suited for large scale power generation near major demand sites and that b) there will be a considerable increase in the elasticity if substantial investments in electricity infrastructure towards the integration of renewables are carried out.
In the transport sector current infrastructure serves road vehicles with internal combustion engines [Schaefer et al. 2009] . Both at the level of local urban transport as well as for long-distance freight and passenger transport, existing infrastructure makes it difficult to substitute away from carbon-intensive transport modes. However, significant attempts are made to introduce a transport infrastructure suitable for the use of electric cars to facilitate the substitution [Andersen et al. 2009 ]. Furthermore, locally different infrastructures that are focused on non-motorized or public transport reveal that a high share in these other modes is possible: examples at the city level include Freiburg, Copenhagen, Hong Kong as well as high-speed (France, Japan) and freight rail (USA) networks for long-distance transport. In the urban context enhancing public transport infrastructure has been found to have an effect on the price elasticity of demand for carbon-intensive transport [Creutzig and He 2009] . Consumer preferences are also important to determine the elasticity between carbonintensive and low-carbon modes in the case of transportation, since mode choice also involves important trade-offs in terms of security, privacy, comfort and health as well as being driven by habituation to a single mode. Yet easily usable indications of available (public) transport modes may facilitate switching between carbon-free and carbon-intensive modes. Currently the substitution elasticity between clean and dirty transport possibilities is supposedly low, but can be expected to increase with infrastructure projects and institutions promoting intermodal transport.
The previous discussion of the substitution possibilities in two sectors that are crucial for decarbonisation of the economy suggests that the case of an increasing elasticity of substitution is a plausible scenario for the next decades. At least as far as substitution possibilities are driven by appropriate infrastructure, they can be changed by suitable policies. For instance, these may include to give other urban transport modes priority over cars or to adapt national power grids to the requirements of a high share of renewable energy generation.
Our modelling results demonstrate that the timing of such policy measures and their combination with taxes and subsidies matters. Enhancing the substitution possibilities at the right time during the phase of structural change may help the decarbonisation and avoid a severe lock-in. According to our results, if infrastructure measures are taken up too late, mitigation requires high carbon pricing. If they are taken up too early, they may aggravate welfare losses from a lock-in if the other policy measures are insufficient.
The last point indicates a limitation of our interpretation of substitution possibilities in terms of infrastructures: these do not always influence the substitutability in both directions. In case substitutability is increased and the carbon-intensive technology is significantly more competitive, it will receive a larger share of production -implying high welfare losses if no tax against global warming is in place. However, some infrastructure measures do not act on substitutability in this way: tailoring urban transport infrastructure towards public and non-motorized modes facilitates substituting away from car transportation, but will not increase the share of the carbon-intensive mode if no other policy is in place. In future work, we intend to model explicitly which infrastructures influence the substitutability between clean and dirty production in both or only a single direction, while at the same time considering explicitly infrastructure investments as a policy instrument.
Conclusion
This paper discusses how substitution possibilities between carbon-intensive and low-carbon production influence which policy interventions are appropriate for avoiding a carbon lock-in. An ambivalent role for such substitution possibilities is identified: good substitutability increases the risk of a lock-in, but requires less drastic policy interventions to trigger structural change towards the low-carbon economy. A learning-by-doing approach for modelling technological progress in the clean sector with a conventional learning curve implies that a permanent intervention is necessary for structural change towards the low-carbon economy. The policy recommendation of AABH -based on directed technical change -that triggering the structural change requires a merely temporary intervention, seems to be a special case in the parameter space of substitutability and modes of technological development. Characterising the full scope of this parameter space is beyond the scope of this study.
The substitution elasticity between carbon-intensive and low-carbon production cannot be assumed to be constant over the next decades. We identify infrastructures as the main factor determining the substitutability and conclude that infrastructure investments can hence influence the substitution elasticity and be part of the policy response to the carbon lock-in. Disentangling different determinants of substitution possibilities in the major economic sectors that face decarbonisation as well as studying the policy options influencing substitutability are promising topics for future work.
Appendix A. First-order conditions of decentralized agents
Household. The Lagrangian corresponding to the household's maximization problem is:
(U (φ(S t )C t )) 1 (1 + ρ) t + λ t (r t K t + w t L t + Γ t − C t − K t+1 + (1 − δ)K t )) (A.1)
The optimal choice for the household is thus characterized by the following firstorder conditions (with µ t := λ t 1 (1+ρ) t ) :
and ∂L ∂K t = µ t (r t + (1 − δ)) − µ t−1 (1 + ρ) = 0. (A.3)
Final-good Producer. The usual equilibrium price conditions apply including the carbon tax: Table B .3 and B.4 detail all parameters for simulation. Since AABH do not state precisely their employed values for the emission intensity ζ and regeneration rate ξ of the atmosphere, we compute our own emission intensity and regeneration rate with the values for current CO2 increase and dissipation given in [Rezai et al. 2012] .
Parameter Significance η = 2 intertemporal elasticity of substitution = 3, 10 elasticity of substitution between clean and dirty sector ρ = 0.00501 discount rate θ = − 389 ≈ 989, 9 current CO2-concentration: 389 ppm ∆ dis = 6.9 disaster temperature λ = 0.3492 damage scale parameter Parameter Significance δ = 0.141 depreciation of capital g e = 0.07 general productivity growth β = 8 maximum productivity ω = 300 scaling parameter γ = 0.27 curvature of learning curve ζ = 1.7 regeneration capacity of atmosphere ξ = 0.00137 emission intensity K(0) = 5 initial value of capital stock H(0) = 0.3 initial value of knowledge L(t) = 1 normalized size of labour force over all time periods 
